Justice LOHR delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This case presents the issues of whether an initiative petition in support of a constitutional amendment authorizing limited gaming in Trinidad contains sufficient valid petition signatures to qualify for inclusion of the initiative on a statewide ballot, and whether the initiative proponents and initiative protestors complied with the statutory and administrative procedures that govern the petition and initiative process. After the Secretary of State (Secretary) issued an initial determination of insufficiency, the proponents submitted additional signatures in a supplemental petition, and the Secretary issued a formal letter of sufficiency. Both the proponents and the protestors sought judicial review of the Secretary's ruling. The district court reviewed the Secretary's signature count and determined that the Secretary erred as to 364 of the signatures by determining that they were valid. The district court held that without the invalidated signatures, the ballot initiative fell fifty-four signatures short of the constitutionally requisite number for inclusion on a statewide ballot. We affirm in part and reverse in part, reversing the district court's determination of invalidity as to ninety-two of the signatures. Accordingly, the initiative petition contains thirty-eight signatures more than the number of signatures necessary for inclusion on the statewide ballot, and we remand the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FN1. Section 1-40-116(4) requires the Secretary to “verify the signatures on the [initiative] petition by use of random sampling.” § 1-40-116(4), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Subsequently, “[i]f the random sample verification establishes that the number of valid signatures is ninety percent or less of the number of registered eligible electors needed to find the petition sufficient, the petition shall be deemed to be not sufficient.” Id.

FN2. The record reflects that the proponents sought to obtain on appeal a reversal of the Secretary's invalidation of certain signatures in anticipation that the protestors might successfully challenge the validation of others and thereby reduce the number of valid signatures below the constitutionally required number.

FN3. For the sake of convenience, we refer in this opinion to statutory provisions updated through the 1994 Supplement to the Colorado Revised Statutes. Unless otherwise noted, current and parallel statutory provisions are either identical or were amended without relevant changes after 1994.

FN4. For brevity, we sometimes refer to the Secretary's statement of sufficiency or insufficiency as a “sufficiency statement.”

[1] The proponents initially contend that the protestors failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that the protest and complaint filed by the protestors in district court therefore is barred under traditional principles of administrative law. We disagree. Properly construed, the statutes at issue here provide for district court review of the Secretary's sufficiency determination. We conclude that the protestors followed the appropriate review procedure in this case.

*336 [2] [3] If a plaintiff fails to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of an administrative decision, the court may lack jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. Horrell v. Department of Admin., 861 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Colo.1993); Gramiger v. Crowley, 660 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Colo.1983). “Where administrative remedies are provided by statute, the statutory procedure must be followed when the matter complained of is within the jurisdiction of the administrative authority.” Denver-Laramie-Walden Truck Line, Inc. v. Denver-Fort Collins Freight Serv., Inc., 156 Colo. 366, 370, 399 P.2d 242, 243 (1965); accord Brooke v. Restaurant Servs., Inc., 906 P.2d 66, 71 (Colo.1995); Horrell, 861 P.2d at 1197. Plaintiffs must exhaust available and applicable administrative remedies in order to prevent piecemeal application for judicial relief, to avoid unwarranted interference by the judiciary in the administrative process, and to conserve judicial resources. Horrell, 861 P.2d at 1197; see Brooke, 906 P.2d at 71.

[4] The legislature provided two review procedures, one to assure the sufficiency of signatures to support an initiated measure, and the other to address violations of the petition circulation requirements. The first, found in sections 1-40-118 and 1-40-119, 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.), is the procedure that the protestors followed in this case. Sections 1-40-118(1) and 1-40-119 specifically provide for review of the Secretary's determination that a petition contains or lacks a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify for a place on the ballot. See §§ 1-40-118(1), -119, 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Section 1-40-118(1) requires the Secretary to issue “a statement as to whether the petition has a sufficient number of valid signatures” no later than thirty calendar days after the proponents file the petition. § 1-40-118(1), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). A registered elector seeking to protest the Secretary's statement must file a protest in the district court for the county in which the proponents filed the petition within thirty days of the issuance of the Secretary's statement. Id.^FN5 A protest must include the grounds for the protest in accordance with specific statutory requirements. § 1-40-118(2), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). To assist a protestor in determining whether signatures are those of registered electors, the Secretary “shall furnish a requesting protestor with a computer tape or microfiche listing of the names of all registered electors in the state.” § 1-40-118(4), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). A district court must commence a protest hearing as soon as conveniently possible and shall conclude the proceedings within thirty days after commencement. § 1-40-119, 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The district court must “forthwith certif[y]” the results of the hearing “to the designated representatives of the signers and to the protestors of the petition.” Id. Upon application, the Colorado Supreme Court shall review the decision of the district court. Id. The foregoing procedure does not require an administrative review of the Secretary's determination concerning the sufficiency of petition signatures before a protestor can seek judicial relief. See §§ 1-40-118, -119, 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). The protestors properly followed the procedure for district court review outlined in sections 1-40-118 and 1-40-119.

FN5. Section 1-40-118(1), at the time relevant to this case, provided:A protest in writing, under oath, together with three copies thereof, may be filed in the district court for the county in which the petition has been filed by some registered elector, within thirty days after the designated election official issues a statement as to whether the petition has a sufficient number of valid signatures, which statement shall be issued no later than thirty calendar days after the petition has been filed.


§ 1-40-118(1), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). Section 1-40-118(1) was amended without relevant changes in 1995, except for the substitution of “secretary of state” for “designated election official.” See § 1-40-118(1), 1B C.R.S. (1995 Supp.); Ch. 120, sec. 13, § 1-40-118(1), 1995 Colo. Sess. Laws 422, 435.

[5] The proponents' second contention is that the Secretary employed an improper procedure in determining the total number of valid petition signatures after the proponents submitted additional signatures by addendum in response to the Secretary's determination that the original petition lacked the requisite number of valid signatures. Relying on Rule 17.3, 8 C.C.R. 1505-1 (1993), the Secretary reviewed each signature in the original petition and in the addendum to arrive at the total number of valid signatures. The proponents urge that Rule 17.3 is both in derogation of the Secretary's rulemaking authority and in conflict with section 1-40-116(4), 1B C.R.S. (1994 Supp.). They contend that the proper counting method is to add the number of valid signatures on the original petition, determined by random sampling under section 1-40-116(4), to the number of valid signatures stemming from a line-by-line examination of the signatures on the addendum. The method prescribed by Rule 17.3 yielded a total of 49,589 valid signatures, as determined by the Secretary, whereas the method contended for by the proponents resulted in a count of 50,872 valid signatures. Thus, the proponents contend, the Secretary should have added 1,283 signatures to the number of valid signatures. We conclude that the legislature authorized the Secretary to adopt Rule 17.3 and that Rule 17.3 is consistent with section 1-40-116(4). We therefore reject the proponents' argument.

[6] In employing the counting procedure at issue here, the Secretary relied on Rule 17.3. The Secretary promulgated Rule 17.3, which provides:

[7] Rule 17.3 also does not exceed the Secretary's statutory rulemaking authority. The legislature provided the Secretary with rulemaking authority to administer the initiative and referendum process:

[8] [9] In Loonan v. Woodley, 882 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo.1994), we addressed the standard to be applied “in gauging adherence to statutes regulating the right of initiative and referendum.” We held that “[t]he right of initiative and referendum, like the right to vote, is a fundamental right under the Colorado Constitution.” Id. at 1383. Because of the importance of these rights, constitutional and statutory provisions governing the initiative process should be liberally construed so that the constitutional right reserved to the people “ ‘may be facilitated and not hampered by either technical statutory provisions or technical construction thereof, further than is necessary to fairly guard against fraud and mistake in the exercise by the people of this constitutional right.’ ” Id. at 1384 (quoting Montero v. Meyer, 795 P.2d 242, 245 (Colo.1990)). We noted that in the voting rights context, we had held that the rule of substantial compliance provides an acceptable level of statutory compliance. Id. (citing Meyer v. Lamm, 846 P.2d 862, 875 (Colo.1993)). We concluded that “[g]iven the similar nature of the right to vote and the right of initiative and referendum, and the common statutory goal of inhibiting fraud and mistake in the process of exercising these rights, we now hold that substantial compliance is the appropriate standard to apply in the context of the right to initiative and referendum.” Loonan, 882 P.2d at 1384. Accordingly, substantial compliance is the standard we must apply in assessing the effect of the deficiencies that caused the district court to hold invalid the petition signatures at issue in this case. Accord In Re Proposed Initiated Constitutional Amendment “1996-3”, 917 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Colo.1996).

[10] In determining whether initiative proponents have achieved substantial compliance, we must consider (1) the extent of noncompliance, (2) the purpose of the applicable provision and whether that purpose is substantially achieved despite the alleged noncompliance, and (3) whether there was a good-faith effort to comply or whether noncompliance is based on a conscious decision to mislead the electorate. Loonan, 882 P.2d at 1384 (applying by analogy the factors we adopted in Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 227 (Colo.1994), to review substantial compliance under the election regulations of Article X, section 20, of the Colorado Constitution); accord Constitutional Amendment “1996-3”, 917 P.2d at 1276. Employing the substantial compliance standard of review, we now address the particular defects that caused the district court to hold invalid signatures that the proponents contend should have been counted as valid.